In an attempt to explore the different historiographical and pedagogical
to the Armenian Genocide, from denial to recognition, from contextualization
to historicism, from nationalism to human rights, this paper focuses
on the national history curriculums of three countries (Turkey, Armenia and
France). These three countries were selected in order to demonstrate the variety
of historiographies according to the different socio-political and ideological contexts.
In this sense, there exist two levels of comparison: i) the general approach
towards history education, along with human rights education, framing the
national history curriculum, the publications and instructions of the Ministry of
Education determining its implementation; ii) peculiarities concerning the case
of the Armenian Genocide (1915–16), involving the given historical context, its
ideological position and interpretation, and its dis/connection to the claimed
stance. By this comparative analysis, the paper aims to revisit the problems of
the divergence concerning the education of history, particularly in the case of
crimes against humanity.
The link between the nation-states and the education of history has been
one of the much-discussed issues. From nationalist ideologies to political
expediencies, from the consolidation of national identity to the formation
of ideal citizens, from grand historical narratives to pedagogies of moralvalues, the nation-states are often criticized for controlling and influencing
the education of history in line with their interests. Within this frame of reference,
the instruction of contested and sensitive historical events represents
one of the essential controversies, revealing the political intentions behind
educational practices. In an attempt to comparatively analyse the different
approaches to the Armenian Genocide, this paper explores the different historical
narratives, contextualizations and political stances of three countries
(Turkey, Armenia and France), through their national history curriculums,
as well as their history teaching plans and exemplary history textbooks. For
this purpose, the paper consists of three sections. First, a brief overview of
the curriculums of each country is presented regarding their development
and transformation, along with the intentions affecting their regulation and
implementation. Second, the position of the Armenian Genocide within the
national curriculums and history teaching plans is illustrated, accompanied
by the political stances of each country towards the issue. Last but not least,
the way the Armenian Genocide is taught in history textbooks is comparatively
analysed in relation to their explanation of the causes and conditions
resulting in the decision of deportation and its implementation, as well as
the consequences and long-term effects that can be traced up to the present.
History education and the curriculum
The curriculum is the core of education: it consists of guidelines responding
to questions such as ‘what should be taught, to whom, under what circumstances,
how, and with what end in mind’ (Null 2011, 5). Curriculum is what
signifies i) aims and objectives of education, ii) subjects, iii) their distribution
at different levels of education, iv) educational materials and their content,
v) teaching methods. In this regard, school curriculums are of the utmost
importance in the formation of ‘ideal’ citizens, their apprehension of certain
moral values, civic rights and duties, fundamental knowledge and, naturally,
the history of their nation.1
History first appeared in the national curriculums in the 19th century when
public education systems were more or less established in many countries –
almost at the same time that history became a modern academic discipline.
This early inception within the educational system also showed the significance
of history in terms of the formation of future citizens (Carretero
and Bermudez 2012, 634). Concerning the role of history in relation to the
construction of national identity, there are three different approaches: the
‘romantic’ promotes social cohesion, the ‘empirical’ stresses the transmissionof historical knowledge, and the ‘civic’ concentrates on the development
of civic competence (Carretero, Asensio and Rodríguez-Moneo 2012, 4).
To give an individual a sense of belonging to a nation and to promote his
or her self-identification as a citizen of that nation and the awareness of
the responsibilities it enforces, historical knowledge and a consciousness of
a common past plays an essential part.
As it is the curriculum-makers who determine which subjects should be
emphasized and which should be excluded or ignored, how to represent
historical events, people, facts and in which context, the curriculum is also
a reflection of what constructs the national unity of a particular ‘present’
(Brehm 2014, 319). The national curriculum consolidates a uniform
identity administered to all students and leads to the quest of establishing
a single ‘grand narrative’ that would eliminate alternative narratives
and compel the teaching of a precise interpretation of the past (Ahonen
2001, 190). However, since the circumstances that define the national unity
tend to change given the politics of a certain time, so does the curriculum.
Therefore, the history curriculum is one of the most unstable components
of education, continuously altered depending on the transformations that
occur in the socio-
cultural and historical-political conditions of a specific
2017, 597). Consequently, a comparison of national history
in Turkey, Armenia and France requires taking into account the
country-specific circumstances and their transformation over time.
Approaches to national histories: comparing curriculums
To start with, in Turkey, the national history curriculum has undergone
several major reforms that are mostly invoked by three political stances:
nationalism, Islamism and a democratic initiative. Nationalism, as the first
and foremost, contains ideological shifts and escalations that are marked by
the socio-political context of the era. The 1930s witnessed the establishment
of nationalist ideology of Kemalism, which introduced a series of reforms
to depart from the Ottoman legacy, in particular its religious character, in
order to embrace Western values, based on six founding principles of the
Turkish Republic: populism, secularism, revolutionism, nationalism, republicanism
and statism (Zürcher 2005, 181). In this period, as an extension of
the efforts to demolish the claims of other nations over national territory, the
‘Turkish History Thesis’ claimed the roots of the Turkish nation were deeply
established in Anatolia, where its early civilizations and inhabitants were
originally Turk (Akpınar et al. 2017, 14). By the 1960s, as the first militarycoup in the history of the Republic took place, the nationalist tone of its
history education was principally influenced by a political attempt to balance
Islam and modernization, that is, the emerging ‘Turkish-Islam synthesis’,
and the main objective of national education was identified as a means of
forming ‘self-sacrificing and virtuous citizens who are loyal to their family,
nation, country, Turkish revolutions and ideals’ (Akdağ and Kaymakçı 2011,
858). After the 1980 coup, the ‘Turkish-Islam synthesis’ became the dominant
ideology in educational practices. As a result, the life and principles of
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic,
were integrated into the curriculum, along with religion – that is, Sunnite
Islam – becoming a compulsory subject in order to educate moral values;
it reflected an attempt to reconcile Kemalism with Islam, by stripping it of
its traditional connotations, particularly that of secularism (Nohl 2008, 36).
From this perspective, it can be argued that the second political stance, that
of Islamism, eroded the emphasis on secularity that had been perceived as
one of the pillars of national education in Turkey. Hence, the Islamization
of education constitutes one of the central disputes that can be traced back
to the 1950s, a period marked by the emergence of Imam Hatip schools that
specialized in religious education and the training of imams (Kafadar 2002,
354). This political stance is particularly enhanced by the many educational
reforms in the 2000s, initiated by the governments formed by the AKP (Justice
and Development Party), the conservative political party that has been in
power since 2002. Aside from the consolidation of many existing religious
aspects of the national curriculum and the introduction of new elective
courses, such as Kur’an-ı Kerim [Qur’an], Hz. Muhammed’in Hayatı [Prophet
Muhammad’s Life] and Temel Dinî Bilgiler [Fundamentals of Religion], these
reforms also seek to establish an Islamized approach to citizen formation
(Kaya 2015, 58). One significant example would be the association of moral
values with religious content, explaining ‘tolerance’ with ‘Muhammad’s “tolerant
attitude” towards the Christians of Yemen’ or ‘human rights’ with the
‘farewell sermon [khutba] of the prophet’, followed by the argument that human
rights are integral to and guaranteed by Islam (Türkmen 2009, 391, 395).
Though currently replaced by an Islamized context, the introduction of
global citizenship and the education of universal values was actually an
extension of Turkey’s drive for membership to the European Union (EU),
and therefore the educational reforms at the beginning of 2000s prescribed
a transformation of the overall system to adhere to EU standards. Thedemocratic initiative simultaneously has marked this period and has been
mirrored in education as well. As the long-ignored minorities of Turkey –
Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Alevis, etc., as well as oppressed groups such
as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals and intersexuals (LGBTIs) – have
started to voice their demands for equality and recognition, elective courses
in several local languages have been introduced, textbooks have been partially
cleared of discriminatory statements, and subjects concerning human
rights and democracy have been added to the curriculum (Çayır 2014, 2–5;
Akdağ and Kaymakçı 2011, 860–61). Despite these developments, a certain
Islamized version of the Kemalist nationalism still persists, and thus, the
curriculums and the textbooks ‘still portray Turkey as a country that is homogenous,
monolingual, and mono-religious’ (Çayır 2014, 115).
For Armenia, the conditions leading to the educational reforms can be categorized
not in the sense of the chronological transformations in political
stances, but rather in terms of extending existing approaches towards educational
policy: that is, of constructing a post-Soviet national identity through
creating a sense of citizenship, aligning with international educational standards
and the educating the diasporic communities. In the 1990s, with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an independent Republic
of Armenia, the reforms bore a twofold objective in shaping the curriculum:
to remove Soviet ideology from education and to redefine what it meant
to be Armenian. However, this did not necessarily mean that the legacy of
Soviet Armenian education was excluded from the history education of the
newly independent Republic. On the contrary, though ‘stripped of communist
internationalism and saturated with nationalism’, the historical narrative
more or less remained similar: ‘starting with ethno-genesis, followed by the
struggle for national liberation and culminating, this time, in independent
nationhood’, instead of the development of class consciousness directed
towards communism as it was during the Soviet period (Akpınar 2017, 43).
It is also important to stress that, as asserted by the historian Ronald Suny,
Armenian nationalist thinking has had a complex evolution that can be dated
back to the late 18th century. It persisted even during the Soviet period, when
Armenian historians successfully fought against the denationalization of their
history. The nationalist tone of the historical narrative was contextualized
and consolidated by using repetitive themes such as the antiquity of the Armenian
people, the continuous occupation of its indigenous ‘homeland’ and
the perpetual struggle for survival and freedom despite betrayals, invasionsand being abandoned by the Great Powers (Suny 2001, 885–87). Nevertheless,
the attempt to construct a post-Soviet Armenian identity and the desired
rupture from Armenia’s Soviet past required concrete strategies, which were
founded in the transition to Western/European educational standards that
would introduce the concept of global citizenship. The hopes of gaining
acceptance to European Union, along with guidance and support of multiple
international organizations, extensively influenced the educational reforms
of the post-Soviet transition process by including democratic values such as
tolerance, human rights and openness into the national curriculum (Terzian
2010, 166). Nonetheless, these global and national contexts surrounding
the educational system have resulted in the development of a dual policy:
the primordial myths of Armenian History, such as the Armenian Church,
coexist with concepts of tolerance and civic practice (Terzian 2010, 169).
One final link that also intersects the global and national dimensions in the
Armenian context would be the diaspora. Since the Armenian Genocide
caused the Armenian people to be dispersed to all over the world, maintaining
Armenian heritage has been a primary concern for both the diasporic
institutions (political organizations, churches, schools, etc.) as well as the
newly founded independent Armenian state. On an emotional level, after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenian diaspora has hoped to
reunite with the homeland, and support its transition to an independent
nation-state. Nonetheless, the Armenian governments’ policies towards the
diaspora, the disagreements on national priorities and the definition of the
nation itself have complicated the situation and raised concerns (Ishkanian
2005, 138–39). Instead, at the beginning of the 2000s, the notion of nation
was redefined in terms that exceeded the political and territorial frontiers
of the state, and accordingly, merged the diaspora and the state into one
nation: national unity was re-established as Armenia became a trans-nation
(Barseghyan 2007, 294). This was also echoed in the educational reforms
with regards to the ‘preservation of national identity’; as described in the
State Programme for Education of 2011–15: ‘the educational system of
the Republic of Armenia is bound to support the activities of educational
centres of the Armenian Diaspora [...] thereby creating conditions for uniting
the globally dispersed Armenian potential’ (Government of Armenia
2011, 16), and as suggested by the Ministry of Education and Science, history
textbooks in several foreign languages were produced for the Sunday
schools of the diaspora, in order to ensure that the national identity could
be preserved through Armenian education (Movsissyan 2016, 3).
In France, where the national education is arguably excessively centralized
(Baqués 2006, 105; Egéa-Kuehne 2003, 329), the educational system contains
a tension caused by two polarized points of view: on the one end, there is
the 19th-century heritage of a national identity and republican values, on
the other, there is European identity and citizenship. In the course of the
19th century, France was one of the ‘historical nations’ whose history was
documented in archives, causing a ‘revolution’ in historiography whereby
writing history depended on archival documents. Thus, at the beginning, it
was their history that was written and taught (Wallerstein 2004, 5). Education,
deemed ‘secular, compulsory, and free’ was an essential part of the French
Republican tradition, with a national curriculum enforced on every future
citizen, no matter what their social class or where they lived.
As one of the national priorities, education had – and is still argued to have –
a critical role in transmitting both historical knowledge and a sense of being
French (Corbett 1996, 5). From this perspective, from the 19th century
onwards, the teaching of history has been a tool for political socialization,
creating French citizens by inculcating them with the republican values of democracy,
freedom and equality, but at the same time imposing respect for the
established order and their glorious ancestors (Lantheaume 2003, 125). As
of the beginning of the 21st century, the French curriculum still put a great
emphasis on national identity, and social cohesion is perceived as loyalty to
essential principles of the Republic, especially that of human rights, highlighting
the intolerance of racism and discrimination (Osler and Starkey 2001,
287–301). Be that as it may, since the 1980s, the reforms to the French curriculum
have increasingly encouraged a sense of European identity (Baqués
2006, 106). With the institutional formation of the European Union in the
last decades of the 20th century, the tendency to Europeanize the educational
systems and develop the European dimension in education has resulted in
a reevaluation of European history throughout the century with the aim of
emerging a European consciousness. Yet, this approach has not necessarily
lead to the abandonment of a nationalist perspective; instead, in the case of
France, it has meant a reinterpretation of national identity as an open concept
compatible with European identity. Hence, as Europe became the focus of
French national education, the curriculum reforms then cultivated a sense of
dual citizenship, that of both national and European (Legris 2010, 139–43).
What is striking in three of the cases is the compliance to a trend that
appeared in the second half of the 20th century, whereby internationaleducational standards were adopted and a global citizenship perspective
developed.2 However, as illustrated in this section, in spite of the reforms
enacted in order to meet with these criteria, a certain inclination to uphold
the national values and national identity as the fundamental basis of citizen
formation still persists in Turkey and Armenia, as well as in France, which results
in a duality of national and global policies towards educational systems.
The Armenian Genocide in the educational frame:
a brief comparison of history textbooks
One of the important outcomes of the evolution in educational systems in
the second half of the 20th century can be pinpointed to the appearance
of the history of the present, relying upon a disciplinary knowledge of
the contemporary world, most particularly that relating to memory. Since
the Second World War there has been an immense rise in human rights
issues triggering memory activism, fuelled by the duty to remember and
to ensure that a crime against humanity, such as the Shoah, would ‘never
again’ be possible. From the 1970s, despite the enduring nationalist element
in educational policies, human rights education became a principal theme,
along with the memories of victims (Meyer, Bromley and Ramirez 2010,
113). Even though, from a neutral point of view, teaching the Armenian
Genocide would fit into this picture, the curriculums and textbooks of each
country imply that it remains much more problematic and does not easily
fit into the political agendas of Turkey, Armenia and France.
In terms of curriculum design, both Turkey and Armenia have official
decrees on the Armenian Genocide. In the case of Turkey, as an extension
of the struggle against the ‘alleged genocides’, on 14 June 2002 the Board
of Education and Instruction ordered different grades at primary and secondary
schools to be taught about all the issues concerning the claims of
the Armenians, along with those of the Greeks and the Assyrians, through
the terms set out by the Ministry of National Education in decrees 272–73
(Ministry of National Education 2002). The teaching plans for the history
courses for the tenth grade (that is, at the age of fifteen) show that the
issue is taught thematically, including but not limited to, the treatment of
non-Muslim minorities in Ottoman Empire, Armenian revolts and atrocities,
the role and intentions of the Great Powers in these revolts, the necessity
of the decision to expel Armenians, intentions behind the terrorist acts
of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the
definition of the concept of genocide and its comparison with Armenianclaims (Ministry of National Education 2011, I–VI). The history textbooks,
produced or approved by the Ministry, present the issue exactly as it has
been regulated by these decrees, as a subject of ‘the Ottoman Empire in
the First World War’, under the subchapter ‘the Caucasian Front’, hence
providing a detailed picture of the ‘Turkish thesis’3 (Tüysüz 2017, 201–8).
In the case of Armenia, with the order N925 A/C, approved by the Ministry
of Education and Science on 9 July 2013, the optional course entitled ‘History
of the Armenian Question’ was regulated for eleventh grade (that is, at
the age of sixteen) as an introductory course on the subject. As explained
the appendix of the order, the aim of this course is to teach the Armenian
Question, that is, ‘the national liberation struggle of the Armenian people
for the sake of restoring the national statehood in its historical homeland and
creating a free, independent, and united Armenia’, which also includes the
Armenian Genocide as a subject (Ministry of Education and Science 2013,
3). According to the standards and teaching plans of history in secondary
education, the Armenian Genocide is taught in the eleventh grade as a part
of the compulsory Armenian History courses. The teaching plan traces
the Armenian Genocide chronologically: starting with the mass murders
in Western Armenia at the end of 19th century, escalating to the Young
Turks’ policy in line with the Hamidian programme of the destruction of
Armenians, and reaching to a total act of genocide in 1915, during the First
World War. The themes also include the role of the Great Powers, the trial
and punishment of those responsible, the Armenian’s ‘heroic’ self-defence
and the process of recognition of the Armenian Genocide (Ministry of
Education and Science Centre for Educational Programmes 2008, 17–18).
This approach is evident in the history textbooks of the eleventh grade,
particularly under the chapter ‘Armenia and the Armenian People during
the Years of the First World War’ (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 246–68).
In the case of France, a law that recognized the Armenian Genocide was
enacted in 2001, therefore increasing its visibility in history education (Falaize
and Mériaux 2006, 12). The French curriculum does not contain any direct
reference to the Genocide, except from one phrase appearing in the History/
Geography programme for the third class of the fourth cycle (corresponding
to ninth grade in a twelve-year education system, that is, at the age of
fourteen) concerning the First World War during which ‘combatants and
civilians suffer extreme violence, as witnessed particularly by the genocide
of the Armenians in 1915’ (Ministry of National Education 2015, 315).
The history textbooks of this grade dedicate two pages to the Armenian
Genocide under the title ‘Europe, a Major Front of Total Wars (1914–1945)’,
within the context of ‘the brutalization of society’ during the First World
War (Blanchard and Mercier 2016, 46–47).
The secondary-education history textbooks of all three countries that cover
the First World War discuss the Armenian Genocide to some extent, yet
with a different narration of the historical events. Within the framework
of this paper, in order to provide an accessible comparison, the different
ways of teaching the Armenian Genocide is primarily discussed through
the previously cited history textbooks.4
Escalation of events
An important subject preceding the Genocide narration is Armenian–Ottoman
relations. To be precise, before the chapters concerning the First
World War, history textbooks of both Turkey and Armenia briefly examine
the situation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, yet with different
interpretations. The Turkish history textbook explains that, during the
empire, the Armenians had flourished in every possible way – economically,
socially, culturally, if not politically – thanks to the Ottoman policies
towards non-Muslim minorities, particularly emphasizing the ‘harmony’
of Armenian–Ottoman relations, treating the Armenians as loyal subjects
[millet-i sadıka] (Tüysüz 2017, 72–73). Whereas the Armenian history textbook
does not accept any possibility of coexistence, instead reviewing
Armenian–Ottoman relations in terms of discrimination, oppression and
the occupation of Western Armenia, while showing the Ottoman efforts
as attempts to deceive Armenians. Describing the Ottoman Empire as
‘backward’, the narration accentuates the necessity of a liberation movement,
with a certain stress on the destiny awaiting the Armenians (Melkonyan et
al. 2015, 182–205). In the French history textbook, there is no reference to
the conditions of the Armenians, with only one phrase expressing that they
were living as a minority in the Eastern parts of the empire (Blanchard and
Mercier 2016, 46).
Regarding the Armenian involvement in warfare, the central subject consists
of Armenian political movements and their actions during the First
World War. Both the Armenian and Turkish textbooks confirm that the
Armenians of the Caucasus sided with the Russians. In the Armenian case,
participation is presented as a ‘voluntary movement’, whereby the supportof Russian military forces would bring about the liberation of Western Armenia.
Though there existed different political positions amongst Armenians
towards the war and the voluntary movement,5 the comprehensive interpretation
of the textbook suggests that the movement stands as a triumphant
part of the history of the Armenian struggle for liberation (Melkonyan et al.
2015, 250–53). From the perspective of the Turkish textbook, the Armenian
actions are depicted as ‘separatist revolts’ against the Ottoman Empire, aided
by the Entente Powers with the aim of expelling the Ottomans from the
war. Therefore the Armenians, who were ‘backstabbing’ the Ottoman army,
are accused of becoming one of the reasons for the empire’s failure on the
Caucasian Front (Tüysüz 2017, 201). The French history textbook, once
again, does not mention the Armenian involvement in the war, however,
but it does remark on the military defeats of Ottomans and the tensions
within the governance of the empire as the reasons for genocide (Blanchard
and Mercier 2016, 46).
Decision, implementation and consequences
The narration of the genocidal process can be compared from this sequence
of events: the decision of deportation, the stages of implementation and
the consequences. From the perspective of the Turkish history textbook,
because of the Armenian revolts and treachery, the Ottoman ruling elite
had to take the decision to ‘deport’6 only after every other measure – such
as the enactment of martial law or the arrests of separatist Armenians – had
failed to provide a satisfactory outcome. Demonstrating the four articles of
the deportation law, the decision was justified by only targeting those who
had disturbed peace, who has fought with weapons and rebelled against the
authorities, and who had conspired or betrayed the country. Moreover, the
textbook also criticizes the representation of the deportation in Western
media, followed by a long explanation about the measures adopted for the
protection of the deportees (Tüysüz 2017, 203–4). The French history textbook
chooses to show the decision to deport with a communiqué of Talaat
Pasha, then minister of the interior, ordering the deportation of Armenians
with the exception of the sick and the disabled, and the arrest of those who
disobeyed. The communiqué presented also cites the prohibition of Armenians
to sell their property and real estate, as their exile is only temporary7
(Blanchard and Mercier 2016, 46). The Armenian history textbook recounts
a more politicized picture of the Genocide, concentrating principally on the
Young Turk policies towards Armenians. According to this perspective, the
political aspect of the Genocide was a consequence of Sultan AbdülhamidII’s plan, devised long before the war,8 to build a new homeland for the
Turks that territorially involved Western Armenia. The economic factor
at play was the confiscation of Armenian wealth and property in order to
provide capital for the state (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 255–56).
Concerning the stages of implementation, all three history textbooks demonstrate
a certain timeframe for the beginning, development and conclusion
of the event. In the Turkish textbook, the precautions against Armenian
uprisings start in April 1915 with the arrests of those involved, intensify
with the enactment and exercise of the deportation law and conclude in October
1915, when the state decided to suspend the deportations, convinced
that the objective had been achieved (Tüysüz 2017, 203–5). The French
textbook, with a small timeline and a map illustrating the acts of violence
against Armenians, presents the start of the Genocide with the arrests of
Armenians in April 1915, followed by two waves of deportations, the first
between May and July 1915 and the second between the end of 1915 and
the summer of 19169 (Blanchard and Mercier 2016, 46). The Armenian
textbook also acknowledges the commencement of the process with the
arrests of the Armenian leaders, however on a different date, October 1914.
Following the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War, able
Armenian men were first recruited into the Ottoman army to be ultimately
eliminated, and then the Armenians on the Caucasian Front were massacred.
By April 1915, the arrested Armenians had been hung, signifying the beginning
of massacres in every region. The Armenian response to the planned
massacres was self-defence, which extended the genocidal process until the
end of 1916 (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 258–9).
As for the consequences, the Turkish history textbook offers plenty of
numbers, as a matter of fact, it almost resembles a balance sheet. According
to the textbook, out of 1.3 million Armenians living in Ottoman territory,
413,067 were deported, 400,000 to 500,000 were not, 383,000 deportees
reached the final destination, 350,000 to 500,000 voluntarily ‘immigrated’
to the Caucasus, thus estimating a ‘casualty’ of 57,000 Armenians during
the overall process (Tüysüz 2017, 205). In the French textbook, for which
the main objective seems to be demonstrate the suffering of Armenians,
the number of murdered Armenians is estimated between 1.2 and 1.5 million,
without any reference to the total number of Armenians living under
the Ottoman Empire, nor to the other consequences of the Genocide
(Blanchard and Mercier 2016, 46). In the Armenian textbook, the narrativeabout regional massacres and self-defensive actions gives precise numbers.
However, the number is eventually rounded up to 1.5 million victims out
of 2.5 million, which also signifies the official claim. Furthermore, the
textbook examines the consequences of the Genocide in a much broader
sense: the destruction of Western Armenian civilization, which is portrayed
as a great loss not only for Armenians but also for the whole world; the
continuation of economic and cultural genocide, that is, the annihilation
of Armenian cultural heritage, a process that continues up to the present
day, not only in Turkey but also in Azerbaijan; the emergence of the
Armenian diaspora and the destiny of the survivors, including those who
were forced to convert to Islam; and the effects of the Genocide on the
following generations of the Armenian nation (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 259,
Table 1. Comparison of the Factual Differences in Textbooks
|Context within the First World War
||Mass violence and brutalization
|Armenian involvement in warfare
||Armenian separatist revolts
||Armenian voluntary movement for liberation
||Failure on the Caucasian Front because of Armenian treachery
||Confiscation of Armenian properties (economics), Young Turk policies (politics)
||Military defeats of Ottomans, tensions within the state
||Massacres and Genocide
||Deportation and Genocide
||Arrests of Armenians involved in revolts
end of implementation
|Arrests of Armenians
Recruitment of Armenian men
Massacres on the Caucasian Front
Hanging of Armenian leaders
Massacres in every region
|Arrests of Armenians
First wave of deportations
Second wave of deportations
||April 1915 to October 1915
||October 1914 to end of 1916
||April 1915 to summer 1916
|Consequences in numbers
||57,000 casualties out of 1.3 million Armenians
||1.5 million Armenians victimized out of 2.5 million
||1.2 to 1.5 million Armenians murdered
Claims and Genocide definition
The aftermath of the Genocide constitutes an important interruption of
the chronological narrative in both the Armenian and Turkish textbooks;
rather they continue with different stages of recognition and/or denial,
with conflicts lasting up until the present.10 The Turkish textbook jumps
to the conclusion of the First World War and the treaties signed in order
to establish the present territorial boundaries – a topic that is actually examined
elaborately in the succeeding chapter – as means to demonstrate
the irrelevance of the Armenian claims over territory, particularly according
to the internationally acknowledged Treaty of Lausanne. Moreover,
the textbook argues that the Armenians developed their scheme against
Turkey as a strategy to protect national consciousness and prevent further
the assimilation of Armenians in the diaspora. In this context, a four-stage
plan was introduced to enforce the recognition of the Genocide, leading
to monetary compensation and territorial restitution. For this purpose, Armenians
founded terrorist organizations, such as Armenian Secret Army
for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), to attract international attention
to the Armenian cause by killing Turkish diplomats and their families. After
the independence of Armenia, the conflicts became an issue for the
foreign policies of both countries, this time marked by the attempts of
the Armenian lobby to influence the international community (Tüysüz
The Armenian textbook pursues another route towards the recognition
process. The aftermath of the Genocide is discussed through international
reactions towards the issue, including testimonies, publications, journals,
reports and condemnations of the massacres by political figures. As the first
step to recognition, the textbook notices the trials of Young Turks in 1919
by Turkish court-martials, which sentenced the perpetrators to death for
their crimes against Armenians. Yet, the textbook implies, since the perpetrators
had already fled the country, the punishment was not carried out by
Turkish authorities or the Entente Powers, but by self-sacrificing Armenians
with operation ‘Nemesis’, inspired from the Greek mythological goddess
of retribution, which sought the assassinations of all those responsible for
the Armenian Genocide. Stating that the recognition process has entered
a new phase after the Second World War, the textbook affirms the rise of
international recognition of the Genocide and the persistence of Turkey’s
denial, an aspect that still, after a hundred years, determines political relations
between two countries (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 262–67).
Since all three textbooks provide a definition of ‘genocide’, one convenient
comparison would be the purpose behind the introduction of the concept.
For the Turkish and the Armenian cases, the objective seems quite obvious:
the former to denounce the claims of genocide and the latter to proclaim
it. The Turkish textbook, citing the definition from the UN Convention,
asserts that the deportation did not aim at Armenians per se, rather those
who threatened the security on the Caucasian Front, adding the fact that
the intention was not their extermination, because if it were the case, then
the Ottoman ‘state’ would not have made the effort to deport them, but
just would have murdered the Armenians where they were (Tüysüz 2017,
208). In the Armenian textbook, the invention of the concept by Raphael
Lemkin (1900–59) is explained by his overview of the Armenian case, and
a full legal description of the concept is cited, along with five acts defining
an event as genocide. Since the Turks carried out all of the five actions,
the textbook declares the legitimacy to address the events as ‘genocide’ in
accordance with the UN Convention (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 264–65). For
the French textbook, however, the objective remains ambiguous, since the
definition appears as an exercise in words, and the self-evaluation questionnaire
demands students to count three factors that justify the events to be
described as an ‘extermination’ rather than a ‘genocide’11 (Blanchard and
Mercier 2016, 46–47).
The comparison of different approaches to teaching the Armenian Genocide
clearly shows that history education continues to be exposed to political
influence. In the cases of Armenia and Turkey, the instruction of the Armenian
Genocide confirms the countries’ political stances towards the issue:
Turkey, in denial, attempts to construct an interpretation of the historical
events that refutes the claims of genocidal intentions, whereas Armenia
interprets the historical significance of the Genocide in their struggle for
national independence. That being said, it is important to remember that,
within the framework of history education in Armenia, the Genocide holds
a fundamental part of the centuries-long battle against foreign occupation
and the national struggle for liberation, which persists as the central
theme in the national history curriculum (Akpınar et al. 2017, 45). While
in the case of Turkey, the historical significance of the Genocide cannot
be viewed without considering contemporary conflicts, hence its historical
contextualization contains only the elements that affirm the official thesis.
Additionally, given the fact that the Turkish stance tends to alter over timedepending on the political state of affairs or the allegations, the historical
narrative evolves accordingly.
The French approach towards teaching the Armenian Genocide might appear
intriguing in respect to the historical neutrality of the country. However,
the French position seems to involve a lot of political, historiographical and
pedagogical confusions. It is political because the position tends to fluctuate
according to political influence and international diplomatic relations, as
demonstrated in the comparisons of the 2012 and 2016 editions of the same
history textbook. Historiographical because, as ascertained by Sophie Ferhadjian
in her analysis of how to teach the Armenian Genocide, the attempt
is to explain the issue without addressing the essential historical context such
as the history of the Armenians, the rise of nationalism in the 19th century
or the Eastern Question as well as the Armenian Question (2006, 4–5).
Pedagogical because, as stated by Falaize and Mériaux, multiple constraints
characterize its instruction: the authors of the textbooks do not have a comprehensive
knowledge of the issue; the time and place devoted to it within
teaching plans are very limited; it lacks documentation to prove it as ‘genocide’,
and thus the civic aim of introducing such ‘brutalization’ of society is
in vain (Falaize and Mériaux 2006, 13). In this regard, including the Armenian
Genocide in the French history curriculum does not seem to have any intention
other than to illustrate an example of mass violence preceding the Shoah.
Briefly, the comparison of national history curriculums and history textbooks
of the aforementioned countries suggest that the teaching of disputable and
sensitive historical events still remains problematic. The primary concern
appears not to teach about this crime against humanity in order to raise
consciousness and responsibility, but to use it either to consolidate national
identity as in case of Armenia, or to confirm a political position as in case
of Turkey, or to reaffirm republican values with a de-contextualized example
of mass violence as is the case of France.
Oyku Gurpınar is a PhD candidate in History and Civilizations at the School for
Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (French: Ecole des hautes etudes en
sciences sociales; EHESS), Paris. Her studies on the Armenian Genocide include
themes such as familial memory of the Genocide, transmission of memory between
generations, perceptions of the Genocide among Armenian youth, as well
as the historiography and pedagogies concerning the Genocide. For this purpose, Gurpınar has participated in three research projects, conducted field studies in
Turkey, Armenia, France and Lebanon, published articles and presented papers
at international conferences.
1 According to Anderson, nation is an imagined community in the sense that i) its
members lack face-to-face interaction with most of the other members, ii) and yet it assumes
a horizontal comradeship amongst its subjects, iii) these communities are distinguished from
one another depending on the manner they are imagined, iv) thus, the limits of a nation define
the boundaries of where one nation ends and another begins (Anderson 2006, 6–7). In this
regard, Anderson asserts that nationalism indeed accords with the evolution of educational
systems, since schools and universities (re)produce the most preeminent imagination of
a national community (Anderson 2006, 71).
2 It is essential to underline the fact that in the context of French education what
is perceived to be ‘European’ citizenship corresponds to ‘global’ citizenship in the contexts
of Turkey and Armenia. However, in the case of France, since the values of the republic are
considered as ‘universal’, this duality is assumed to be complementary instead of conflictual.
Nevertheless, this does not absolve French education from its nationalist tendencies, especially
regarding the colonial past and confrontation with it (Lantheaume 2003, 138).
3 According to Gürpınar, the ‘Turkish Thesis’ on the Armenian Genocide constitutes
a complex combination of three distinct approaches: a right-wing version, a left-wing version
and a centrist version. Diverging in their justification of Ottoman response to Armenian
militancy, the three versions also follow a concurrent path in the development of the official
thesis. The right-wing version contextualizes the issue in terms of ethnic conflicts and nationalist
movements, accusing Armenians of treachery and savagery, while the left-wing version
emphasizes the imperialist hegemony of the era, targeting Armenian separatism through its
collaboration with the Great Powers, and thus becoming the servant of imperialism. Finally,
the centrist version claims a state-centric argument, denouncing the Armenian revolts as
disobedience to state sovereignty (Gürpınar 2016, 221).
4 It is also important, at this point, to point out the fact that each country has a different
policy towards textbook production. In Turkey, textbooks are produced either directly
by the Ministry of National Education or by private publishers, also the Ministry can set up
an independent commission to write a draft or order the purchase of existing textbooks. In
any case, the textbooks are subjected to inspection and approval of the Ministry of National
Education before being circulated (Akpınar et al. 2017, 19). In France, however, the production
of textbooks is highly regulated by a very competitive market whose primary actors are
private publishers where the only constraint is to follow the national programmes (Baques
2007, 127). Armenia stands somewhere in between, having both the market-oriented system
and the central commission for the selection of textbooks. In this regard, the textbooks are
produced by the private publishing houses to be enlisted for the competition held by the
Ministry of Education and Science, and the results are declared as the authorized textbooks
of the following academic year (Zolyan and Tigran 2008, 17).
5 The textbook dedicates a whole page for the four positions apropos the voluntary
movement. According to the textbook, Hunchakians, linking Armenian’s autonomy to victory, openly declared for the Entente Powers, while the Dashnakians advised Armenians to fulfil
their military duties to the country of which they are subjects, resulting in a divided position
depending on the region; in Western Armenia they called for the maintenance of neutrality,
whereas in the Caucasus they supported reunion with Russian troops. Bolshevik Armenians,
as a representative of the diasporic opposition, alleged the war as unjust and disclaimed the
Armenian struggle for liberation (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 254).
6 The Turkish history textbook addresses the events only as ‘deportation’, in fact the
word ‘genocide’ is only used with the adjective ‘alleged’ in front of it.
7 What is most thought‑provoking is the fact that this document, originally found in
the Ottoman Archives, is frequently employed by the denialists for the rejection of genocidal
intentions, as it implies the ‘return’ of the Armenians. The 2012 edition of the same history
textbook prefers to give reference to the testimonies of Henry Morgenthau, which includes
a quotation from Talaat Pasha explaining the deportation decision (Blanchard, Veber and
Lozac’h 2012, 42). A discussion concerning the French history textbooks might help explain
the reasons for such a transformation. According to an article published on a Franco-Turk
website, the instruction of the Armenian Genocide in these history textbooks lacked historical
objectivity and trustworthy historical evidence such as archival documents and ignored
historiographical developments on the issue, therefore bypassing the Turkish position in a way
that would provoke the Turkish diaspora and complicate diplomatic relations (Houssay 2014).
8 Reference to Hamidian massacres as a contextual precedent of the Genocide also
appears in other Armenian history textbooks, with a specific emphasis on the ‘Turkish way of
resolving issues, and that is through massacres’ (Akpınar et al. 2017, 56).
9 A curious point revealed in the comparison between the Turkish and the French
textbooks would be the fact that the date considered as the completion of implementation by
the former is viewed as the beginning of a new phase by the latter. Indeed, the Turkish history
textbook does not mention at all what has befallen Armenians between the end of 1915 and December
1918, when a law was enacted permitting the return of Armenians (Tüysüz 2017, 205).
10 Once again, the French history textbook reports neither the conflicts, nor the
recognition process concerning the Genocide. Be that as it may, the 2012 edition of the same
history textbook mentions the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by both the United
Nations and France, as well as the denial of Turkey (Blanchard, Veber and Lozac’h 2012, 42).
11 Another interesting comparison between the 2012 and 2016 editions of the French
history textbook would be the approach to the concept concerning the Armenian case. The
former redirects the reader to another page for the definition of ‘genocide’, which is to be
found in the chapter dedicated to the Shoah, also in the self-evaluation questionnaire the
activity is to develop arguments that justify the events in 1915–16 as ‘genocide’ (Blanchard,
Veber and Lozac’h 2012, 42–43, 78).
LIST OF REFERENCES
Ahonen, Sirkka (2001) ‘Politics of Identity through History Curriculum: Narratives of the
Past for Social Exclusion – or Inclusion?’, Journal of Curriculum Studies, vol. 33, no. 2, 179–94.
Accessed 15 February 2018: doi.org.
Akdağ, Hakan and Selahattin Kaymakcı (2011) ‘A Chronological Approach to Development
of Social Studies Education in Turkey’, Educational Research and Reviews, vol. 6, no. 15,
854–63. Accessed 15 February 2018: doi.org.
Akpınar, Alişan, Sos Avetisyan, Hayk Balasanyan, Fırat Gullu, Işıl Kandolu, Maria Karapetyan,
Nvard V. Manasian, et al. (2017) History Education in Schools in Turkey and Armenia:
A Critique and Alternatives. Istanbul and Yerevan: History Foundation (Tarih Vakfı) and Imagine
Center for Conflict Transformation. Accessed 12 November 2017: caucasusedition.net.
Anderson, Benedict (2006) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (1st edn 1983). New York, NY: Verso Books.
Baques, Marie-Christine (2006) ‘History Textbooks in France: Between National Institutions,
Publishers and Teaching Practice’, in School History Textbooks across Cultures: International
Debates and Perspectives, ed. Jason Nicholls, 105–18. Oxford: Symposium Books.
Barseghyan, Kristine (2007) ‘Changing Turkish Other in Post-Soviet Armenian Discourse on
National Identity’, Polish Sociological Review, vol. 159, no. 3, 283–98. Accessed 15 February
Blanchard, Emilie, Martin Veber and Anthony Lozac’h (2012) Histoire – Geographie 3e:
Education civique [History – Geography 3rd: Civic Education]. Paris: Editions Lelivrescolaire.
fr. Accessed 15 February 2018: fr.calameo.com.
Blanchard, Emilie and Arnaud Mercier (2016) Histoire – Geographie 3e (Cycle 4): Enseignement
moral et civique [History – Geography 3rd (Cycle 4): Moral and Civic Education]. Paris:
Brauch, Nicola (2017) ‘Bridging the Gap. Comparing History Curricula in History Teacher
Education in Western Countries’, in Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture
and Education, ed. Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger and Maria Grever, 593–612. London:
Brehm, William (2014) ‘Strategic ‘Linguistic Communities’: The Political Struggle for Nationalism
in School’, in (Re)Constructing Memory: School Textbooks and the Imagination of the
Nation, ed. James H. Williams, 319–25. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Carretero, Mario, Mikel Asensio and Maria Rodriguez-Moneo, eds(2012) History Education
and the Construction of National Identities. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Carretero, Mario, and Angela Bermudez (2012) ‘Constructing Histories’, in Oxford Handbook
of Culture and Psychology, ed. Jaan Valsiner, 625–46. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Cayır, Kenan (2014) Who Are We? Identity, Citizenship and Rights in Turkey’s Textbooks.
Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı [History Foundation]. Accessed 28 November 2017: tarihvakfi.org.tr.
Corbett, Anne (1996) ‘Secular, Free and Compulsory: Republican Values in French Education’,
in Education in France: Continuity and Change in the Mitterrand Years, 1981–1995, ed.
Bob Moon and Anne Corbett, 5–21. London: Routledge.
Cayır, Kenan (2014) Who Are We? Identity, Citizenship and Rights in Turkey’s Textbooks.
Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı [History Foundation]. Accessed 28 November 2017: tarihvakfi.org.tr.
Egea-Kuehne, Denise (2003) ‘Understanding Curriculum in France: A Multifaceted Approach
to Thinking Education’, in International Handbook of Curriculum Research, ed. William
F. Pinar, 329–66. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
Falaize, Benoit and Pascal Meriaux (2006) Le genocide armenien a l’ecole [The Armenian
Genocide at school]. Institute National de Recherche Pédagogique. Accessed 15 November2017: ecehg.ens-lyon.fr.
Ferhadjian, Sophie (2006) Reflexions sur le genocide des Armeniens: Specificite et difficulte d’un
Enseignement [Reflections on the Armenian Genocide: specificity and difficulty of an education].
Institute National de Recherche Pédagogique. Accessed 15 November 2017: ecehg.ens-lyon.fr.
Government of Armenia (2011) The Education Development State Programme of the Republic of Armenia
for 2011–2015. Yerevan: Global Developments Fund. Accessed 20 November 2017: www.gdf.am.
Gurpınar, Doğan (2016) ‘The Manufacturing of Denial: the Making of the Turkish ‘Official
Thesis’ on the Armenian Genocide between 1974 and 1990’, Journal of Balkan and Near
Eastern Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, 217–240. Accessed 15 February 2018:doi.org.
Houssay, Aureline (2014) ‘Remarques sur le nouveau traitement pédagogique du ‘génocide
arménien’ dans les manuels scolaires de 3e de college [Remarks on the new pedagogical treatment
of the ‘Armenian Genocide’ in middle school textbooks].’ Turquie-News, 24 October
2014. Accessed 15 February 2018:www.turquie-news.com.
Ishkanian, Armine (2005) ‘Diaspora and Global Civil Society: The Impact of Transnational
Diasporic Activism on Armenia’s Post-Soviet Transition’, in Central Asia and the Caucasus:
Transnationalism and Diaspora, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale, 113–39. London:
Kafadar, Osman (2002) ‘Cumhuriyet Dönemi Eğitim Tartışmaları’ [Debates on education
in the Republican period]’, in Modern Turkiye’de Siyasi Duşunce Cilt 3: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık
[Political thought in modern Turkey vol. 3: modernization and Westernization], ed. Murat
Gültekingil and Tanıl Bora, 351–81. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
Kaya, Ayhan (2015) ‘Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith
and Charity’, South European Society and Politics, vol. 20, no. 1, 47–69. Accessed 15 February
Lantheaume, Francoise (2003) ‘Solidité et Instabilité du Curriculum d’Histoire en France:
Accumulation de Ressources et Allongement des Réseaux’ [Solidity and instability of the
history curriculum in France: accumulation of resources and lengthening of networks]. Education
et societies, vol. 2, no. 12, 125–42. Accessed 15 February 2018: doi.org.
Legris, Patricia (2010) ‘Les Programmes d’Histoire en France: la Construction Progressive
d’une “Citoyenneté Plurielle” (1980–2010)’ [History curriculums in France: the progressive
construction of a ‘Plural Citizenship’ (1980–2010)]. Histoire de l’education, vol. 126, no.
2 (April–June), 121–54. Accessed 15 February 2018: doi.org.
Melkonyan, Ashot, Vladimir Barkhudaryan, Gagik Harutyunyan, Pavel Chobanyan, Aram
Simonyan and Aram Nazaryan (2015) Հայոց պատմություն: 11-րդ դասարան: Հումանիտար
հոսքի դասագիրք [Armenian History: eleventh grade humanities stream textbook]. Yerevan:
Meyer, John W., Patricia Bromley and Francisco O. Ramirez (2010) ‘Human Rights in Social
Science Textbooks: Cross-National Analyses, 1970–2008’, Sociology of Education, vol. 83,
no. 2, 111–34. Accessed 15 February 2018:doi.org.
Ministry of National Education, Board of Education and Instruction (2002) ‘Ermeni, Yunan-
Pontus ve Süryaniler ile ilgili Konuların Orta Öğretim Tarih 1, Tarih 2 ve T. C. İnkılap Tarihi ve
Atatürkçülük Dersi Öğretim Programlarında Yer Alması’ [Inclusion of Armenian, Greek, and
Assyrian issues in secondary education teaching plans of History 1, History 2, and Revolution
History of the Republic of Turkey and Atatürkism], Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Tebliğler Dergisi
[Bulletin of the Ministry of National Education], 14 June 2002 (272), 530–44. Accessed
23 November 2017: tebligler.meb.gov.tr.
Ministry of National Education, Board of Education and Instruction (2011) ‘Ortaöğretim
10. Sınıf Tarih Dersi Öğretim Programı ve Ortaöğretim 10. Sınıf Seçmeli Tarih Dersi Öğretim
Programı [Secondary School 10th Grade History Teaching Programs].’ Öğretim Programları
[Teaching Plans]. Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı [Ministry of National Education]. Accessed
26 June 2017:ttkb.meb.gov.tr.
Ministry of National Education (2015) ‘Les Programmes cycles 2, 3, 4’ [Curriculums for
cycles 2, 3, 4], Bulletin Officiel de l’Education Nationale [Official bulletin for National Education],
26 November 2015. Accessed 30 November 2017: www.education.gouv.fr.
Ministry of Education and Science (2013) ‘Հաստատել հանրակրթական դպրոցի ‹Հայկական
հարցի պատմություն› առարկայի ծրագիրը` համաձայն Հավելվածի [Approval of the programme
of the ‘History of the Armenian Question’ in General Education in accordance with
the appendix].’ Հանրակրթության պետական չափորոշիչ [State Education Standards], 9
July 2013, N925–A/C. Accessed 29 November 2017. www.aniedu.am.
Ministry of Education and Science Centre for Educational Programmes (2008) ‘Հայոց
պատմություն’ առարկայի ավագ դպրոցի ծրագրեր և չափորոշիչներ [‘Armenian History’
programmes and standards for high school].’ Հանրակրթության պետական չափորոշիչ
[State Education Standards], 12 December 2008, N–1078 A/C. Accessed 29 November
Movsissyan, Artak (2016) L’histoire de l’Armenie: Manuel Scolaire [History of Armenia: textbook].
Yerevan: Editions de l’université d’état d’Erevan.
Nohl, Arnd-Michael (2008) ‘The Turkish Education System and its History – an Introduction’,
in Education in Turkey (European Studies in Education), ed. Arnd-Michael Nohl, Arzu
Akkoyunlu-Wigley and Simon Wigley, 15–48. Munster: Waxmann Verlag.
Null, Wesley (2011) Curriculum: From Theory to Practice. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield
Osler, Audrey and Hugh Starkey (2001) ‘Citizenship Education and National Identities
in France and England: Inclusive or Exclusive?’, Oxford Review of Education, vol. 27, no. 2,
287–305. Accessed 15 February 2018: doi.org.
Suny, Ronald Grigor (2001) ‘Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations’,
The Journal of Modern History, vol. 73, no. 4, 862–96.
Terzian, Shelley (2010) ‘Curriculum Reform in Post-Soviet Armenia: Balancing Local and
Global Contexts in Armenian Secondary Schools’, PhD diss. Loyola University Chicago, IL.
Turkmen, Buket (2009) ‘A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality?
A Study of “Religious Culture and Morality” Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula’,
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 29, no. 3, 381–97. Accessed
15 February 2018: doi.org.
Tuysuz, Sami (2017) Ortaoğretim Tarih 10 Ders Kitabı [Secondary education textbook of
history 10]. Ankara: Tuna Matbaacılık.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (2004) World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, NC–
Duke University Press.
Zolyan, Mikayel and Tigran Zakaryan (2008) ‘The Images of “Self” and “Other” in Textbooks
on History of Armenia’, in Contemporary History Textbooks in the South Caucasus, ed. Luboš
Veselý, 11–32. Prague: Association for International Affairs.
Zurcher, Eric Jan (2005) Turkey: A Modern History (1st edn 1993). London–New York, NY:
I. B. Tauris Publishers.
This article has been published in the sixth issue of Remembrance and Solidarity Studies dedicated to the memory of Violence in 20th-century European History.
>> Click here to see the R&S Studies site